The French
Cavalry Corps in 1940
by David
Lehmann
In 1932-1935, the first fully motorized/mechanized
French unit, the 1e DLM (Division Légère Mécanique = Light Mechanized
Division), was born and developed. The 2e DLM was born in 1937 and the 3e DLM
in February 1940. There will be 3 DLMs on 10th May 1940 (1e DLM, 2e DLM and 3e
DLM) forming the French cavalry corps under command of general Prioux.
The DLM is more powerful than the DCR, faster and more
mobile. It is a unit fully adapted to modern mobile warfare. The term
"light" referred to its speed and mobility.
The 1e DLM and 2e DLM became very well trained
divisions (even at the divisional and corps level) with efficient crews and
specialists. Manoeuvres and trainings were organized at large scale in 1935,
1936, 1937 1938, 1939 and the last divisional training in 1940. They included
deep penetration behind fortifications, cooperation with close air support and
close inter-arms cooperation. The crew knew their tanks and how to operate
them. The gunners were skilled and trained. The 3e DLM formed in 1940 had only
reservists who did their military service on horse and some of them discovered
their tank a short time before being engaged, except some officers and
specialists originating from the other DLMs.
The cavalry corps and the corresponding HQ is created
at the mobilization beginning September 1939. It is under the command of
general Prioux until 25th May 1940 when he took command of the 1st army and
general Langlois replaced him at the head of the cavalry corps. The cavalry
corps contains initially only the 1e DLM and 2e DLM. The 1e DLM is then
attached to the 7th army to operate in the Netherlands on 10th May 1940. It is
replaced in the cavalry corps by the 3e DLM on 26th March 1940. During the 1940
western campaign the cavalry corps will regroup 1, 2 or the 3 DLMs.
Each DLM included about 10,400 men and 3,400 vehicles
:
• 1 divisional HQ
• 1 light motorized brigade (BLM = Brigade Légère
Motorisée) with 2 armored cavalry regiments (RC = Régiment de Cuirassiers or RD
= Régiment de Dragons).
1e DLM : 174 tanks (+ 16 reserve tanks) in the 1e BLM
• 4e RC (43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)
• 18e RD (43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)
2e DLM : 174 tanks (+ 16 reserve tanks) in the 3e BLM
• 13e RD (43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)
• 29e RD (43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)
3e DLM : 174 tanks (+ 16 reserve tanks) in the 5e BLM
• 1e RC (43+4 Hotchkiss H39 and 44+4 Somua S35)
• 2e RC (43+4 Hotchkiss H39 and 44+4 Somua S35)
• 1 light motorized brigade (BLM = Brigade Légère
Motorisée) with 1 armored reconnaissance regiment (regiment de découverte) and
1 RDP (Régiment de Dragons Portés = mechanized cavalry regiment)
1e DLM : 107 armored cars in the 2e BLM
• 6e RC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve
armored car)
• 4e RDP : 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 (+2 reserve
armored cars)
2e DLM : 107 armored cars in the 4e BLM
• 8e RC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve
armored car)
• 1e RDP : 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 (+2 reserve
armored cars)
3e DLM : 107 tanks / armored cars in the 6e BLM
• 12e RC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve
armored car)
• 11e RDP : 22 Hotchkiss H35 and 47 Hotchkiss
H39
• 1 divisional AT squadron (EDAC = Escadron
Divisionnaire Anti-Char)
• 1 divisional repair and recovery squadron
• 1 motorized artillery regiment (with all-terrain
tractors)
• 1 motorized AT battery (BDAC = Batterie
Divisionnaire Anti-Char)
• 1 motorized AA battery (BDAA = Batterie
Divisionnaire Anti-Aérienne)
• 1 engineer battalion (3 motorized companies plus a
bridging company)
• 1 telegraph company
• 1 radio company
• 1 carrier-pigeon detachment
• 1 HQ motor transport company
• 1 divisional quartermaster group
• 1 divisional medical group
During early June 1940, the remains of the 5 DLC were
to be converted to a DLM "type réduit", a reduced DLM :
• 1e DLC as 4e DLM
• 2e DLC as 5e DLM
• 3e DLC as 6e DLM
• 4e DLC as 7e DLM
• 5e DLC as 8e DLM
The deteriorating military situation meant only 4e DLM
and 7e DLM were actually formed.
The 1e DLM, 2e DLM and 3e DLM are also reconstituted
beginning June, as reduced DLMs, with men evacuated from Dunkirk and who
returned to France after a transit in Great Britain. These 5 DLMs fought until
25th June 1940.
The cavalry tanks are organized in
"escadrons" (1 escadron = 1 squadron) and in "pelotons" (1
peloton = 1 platoon). For example in a cavalry unit like the 4e Régiment de
Cuirassiers there are : 44 Somua S35 and 43 Hotchkiss H35 (+4 reserve tanks of
each model) :
• 1 regiment command tank (1 Somua S35)
• 1 Somua S35 squadrons group = 43 Somua S35 :
o 1 Somua S35 squadrons group command tank (1 Somua
S35)
o 1st squadron (21 Somua S35) (one
"escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
1 squadron commander tank
4 platoons of 5 tanks
o 3rd squadron (21 Somua S35s) (one
"escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
1 squadron commander tank
4 platoons of 5 tanks
• 1 Hotchkiss squadrons group = 43 Hotchkiss H35 :
o 1 squadrons group command tank (1 Hotchkiss H35)
o 2nd squadron (21 Hotchkiss H35) (one
"escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
1 squadron commander tank
4 platoons of 5 tanks
o 4th squadron (21 Hotchkiss H35) (one
"escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
1 squadron commander tank
4 platoons of 5 tanks
1e DLM
General Picard (27.08.39)
General De Beauchesne (23.05.40)
2e DLM
General Altmayer (23.08.39)
General
Bougrain (13.01.40)
3e DLM
General Langlois (01.02.40)
General De La Font (26.05.40)
General Testard (06.06.40)
Cavalry corps
"Premier et dernier au feu" means
"first in and last out"
At the beginning of the 1940 western campaign, there
are 83 French divisions in the north-east area (3 DLMs, 3 DCRs, 5 DLCs, 72
infantry divisions and 4 cavalry brigades). The 6 DCR/DLM armored divisions
were never the equivalent in power and combined arms than a Panzerdivision.
There are also 10 British divisions (BEF), 22 Belgian divisions (but their real
men strength corresponds only to 12 divisions) and 8 Dutch divisions. The
allied had therefore a strength of 123 divisions (113 with the real strength of
the Belgian divisions) to face a total of 136 German divisions. There are the
equivalent of 13 French divisions on the Maginot line and 6 French divisions
initially left to face the Italians.
The allied Dyle-Breda plan is to stop the German
offensive in Belgium and the Netherlands with the French 1st and 7th armies and
the BEF, using the Ardennes and the Sedan area as a hinge on their right flank.
The 3 French DLMs have to delay the German troops of Armee Gruppe B (3
Panzerdivisionen) and to establish contacts with the Belgian and Dutch armies
in order to allow the allied infantry to deploy. The French have therefore a
fast mechanical force but lacking in AA protection and without serious air
cover.
The defense of the Ardennes and of the Meuse River is
taken in charge by the 9th and 2nd French armies : 7 French divisions generally
largely under equipped (sometimes no AA guns like for the 55e DI and 71e DI
which had also respectively only 12 and 8 AT guns instead of 62) defended an
overstretched front on the Meuse River (from Houx to Sedan - that is 15-30 km
for each division whereas an infantry division should theoretically defend a
5-7 km front only) facing 40 German divisions including 7 concentrated
Panzerdivisionen, with about 1400 German bombers and attack planes concentrated
on a small area during hours. The French troops can there only rely on a good
artillery support but only on very insufficient fortifications. The Maginot
Line by itself is indeed stopping at the border with the Luxembourg.
General Blanchard (French 1st army) was opposed to the
entry in Belgium, judging the Belgian army unable to delay the Germans long
enough to enable the deployment of the French troops in Belgium. Indeed the
Belgian neutrality obsession did not allow the allied troops to enter Belgium
before the German invasion. He evaluated the required time at about 1 week. The
Belgians should also have prepared entrenched positions and anti-tank ditches
on the future French positions but grossly nothing was done except the
beginning of an anti-tank ditch next to Gembloux.
General Gamelin, the commander in chief, nevertheless
saw several advantages in the Dyle-Breda operation :
• protection of the industrial area of north-eastern
France
• shortening the front between the Maginot Line and
the North Sea by 70 km
• offering better chances to rescue the Belgian army
and integrate it in the whole allied deployment
The British of course wanted the war as far as
possible from the homeland.
The generals Georges (commander in chief north-east)
and Bilotte (1st army corps) thought that only a reduced version of this
operation, on the Escaut River, was really possible and that the Dyle-Breda
line was too far. General Prioux, commander of the cavalry corps, which will
have the task to delay the Germans in Belgium with the 2e DLM and the 3e DLM
shared the same point of view and did not think that the Belgian army was able
to face the German troops.
General Corap, commander of the 9th army on the Meuse
River is also opposed to the Dyle-Breda operation and is worried about the
weakness of his troops and the too huge front they have to defend (20-30 km for
one division instead of 5-7 km). General Giraud (French 7th army), known for
his rather offensive spirit, is also opposed to the operation in Belgium.
Nevertheless, Gamelin persisted and engaged not only French troops in Belgium
on the Dyle but also the potential of the 7th army in an operation in the
Netherlands, sacrificing troops that could have constituted a crucial reserve
later.
On 10th May 1940, the German army attacks the
Netherlands, Belgium and the Luxembourg. Some 4,500 airborne troops (paratroops
and glider troops) and Brandenburg commandos seize several important bridges
including 2 bridges on the Albert canal, enabling the XVI. Panzerkorps to
rapidly cross and capture Maastricht. The Eben Emaël fort is quickly and easily
defeated by a special assault group. During the night the German engineers establish
a bridge to cross the Meuse River.
1. THE CAVALRY CORPS IN BELGIUM
The French cavalry corps (2e and 3e DLM) enters in
Belgium on 10th May at 10h30, followed by the French 1st army. They wished they
could have moved before the German attack but this was not possible due to the
Belgian neutrality. General Prioux sends captain Métivier from his staff to
makes liaison with general Krahe, commander of the 3rd Belgian corps. He
reports the little will of cooperation of the Belgians. He also notes that the
"Cointet" mobile AT obstacles planned around Gembloux are not
deployed, they are completely dispersed several kilometres further around
Perwez. The future French positions should have been fortified by the Belgians
but except a short portion of AT ditch absolutely nothing was done. The French
troops will therefore have to defend on a completely unprepared position. To
add to these bad news, Belgian railroad workers went on strike and delayed the
arrival of armored elements of the cavalry corps.
General Prioux estimates that it will be difficult to
fulfil the delay mission with the German massive air superiority. The operation
on the Dyle was based on two hypothesises which appeared already wrong :
• the value of the defensive position at Gembloux
• the capacity of resistance of the Belgian army
He contacts the high command to try to modify the
operation into the less ambitious "Escaut" one since only the 3
motorized infantry divisions of the French 1st army were already moving in
Belgium. Bilotte, Georges and Blanchard all disagreed with him. The French 1st
army will move day and night despite the Luftwaffe. The mission of the cavalry
corps is to delay the German troops around Hannut until 14th May before
withdrawing behind the French 1st army deployed in Gembloux gap between the
Dyle and the Meuse Rivers.
On 11th May, the 4.PzD crosses the Meuse River while
the cavalry corps is deploying in the Ophelissem, Hannut, Huy area. On 12th
May, the Belgian army retreats to the Dyle River between Anvers and Louvain,
exposing the flanks of the French cavalry corps.
The battle of Hannut (12th-14th May) is the first big
tank battle of World War 2 : 411 French tanks (3e DLM and 2e DLM) are facing
674 German tanks (4.PzD and 3.PzD). The battle takes place between the Petite
Gette stream and the Méhaigne small river, in the area hold by the 3e DLM. The
2e DLM is far less engaged. On 12th May only the 4.PzD is really involved, the
3.PzD having completely crossed the Meuse River only for the 13th May.
The area is favorable to the tanks, therefore to the
enemy whose tanks are more numerous. The Germans are also strongly supported by
the Luftwaffe whereas on the French side each DLM has only 3 modern
reconnaissance aircrafts attached. The battle of Hannut shows that the Somua
S35 tank can be at least the equal of the Panzer III and that the Panzer I and
Panzer II are rather useless against the French tanks.
During the battle of Hannut, general Prioux had the
actual command of a real French tank corps facing a German tank corps. They
inflicted heavy losses to the Germans. The use of such a French tank corps is
unique during the 1940 campaign except perhaps the formation of the
"groupement Buisson" beginning June for the battles on the Aisne and
Retourne Rivers south of Rethel which grouped the 3e DCR and the 7e DLM.
On 14th May, having blocked the Germans as long as it
was ordered, during 2 days, the cavalry corps moves back behind the French
lines at Gembloux. Prioux is ordered to let part of his artillery to the French
1st army. During the battle of Gembloux (14th-15th May), the XVI. Panzerkorps
will again be blocked by the 1e DM (Division Marocaine = Moroccan infantry
division) and the 15e DIM (Division d'Infanterie Motorisée = motorized infantry
division) which anchored their defenses on the Bruxelles-Namur railroad and the
cities of Gembloux and Ernage. All the German assaults are repulsed and the
XVI. Panzerkorps sustains heavy losses. Nevertheless the German breakthrough at
Sedan will force the rather successful allied troops in Belgium to move back.
1.1 The battle of Hannut (12th-14th May 1940)
3. PzD
PzBfWg : 29
Panzer I : 117
Panzer II : 129
Panzer III : 42
Panzer IV : 26
armored cars : 56 (including 23 with
a 2.0cm L/55 gun)
3.7cm PaK L/45 : 51
2.0cm FlaK 30/38 : 24
8.8cm FlaK L/56 : 9
7.5cm leIG : 24
15cm sIG : 8
10.5cm leFH : 24
15cm sFH : 12
+ attached M.G.-Btl.7 : 12 3.7cm PaK L/45
+ attached II./Flak-Lehr-Rgt : 9 8.8cm FlaK L/56 and
24 2.0cm/3.7cm FlaK
4. PzD
PzBfWg : 15
Panzer I : 141
Panzer II : 111
Panzer III : 40
Panzer IV : 24
armored cars : 56 (including 23 with
a 2.0cm L/55 gun)
3.7cm PaK L/45 : 51
2.0cm FlaK 30/38 : 24
8.8cm FlaK L/56 : 9
7.5cm leIG : 24
15cm sIG : 8
10.5cm leFH : 48
15cm sFH : 24
+ attached Pz.Jg.Abt.654 : 12 3.7cm PaK L/45
+ attached M.G.-Btl.7 : 12 3.7cm PaK L/45
TOTAL XVI. Panzerkorps
tanks : 674 (including 132
Panzer III and Panzer IV + )
armored cars : 112 (including 46
with a 2.0cm L/55 gun)
3.7cm PaK L/45 : 138
2.0cm / 3.7cm FlaK : 72
8.8cm FlaK L/56 : 27
7.5cm leIG : 48
12cm sIG : 16
10.5cm leFH : 72
15cm sFH : 36
+ 14 infantry/motorcycle battalions
2e DLM
Hotchkiss H35 : 84
Somua S35 : 88
armored cars : 107 (including 40
Panhard 178 and 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1)
47mm SA37 L/53 AT guns : 8
25mm SA34/37 L/72 AT guns : 12
25mm AA guns : 6
75mm Mle1897 field guns : 24
105mm field guns : 12
+ 3 infantry/motorcycle battalions
3e DLM
Hotchkiss H35 : 22
Hotchkiss H39 : 129
Somua S35 : 88
armored cars : 40 (Panhard 178)
47mm SA37 L/53 AT guns : 8
25mm SA34/37 L/72 AT guns : 12
25mm AA guns : 6
75mm Mle1897 field guns : 24
105mm field guns : 12
+ 3 infantry/motorcycle battalions
TOTAL French cavalry corps
Hotchkiss H35 and H39 : 235
Somua S35 : 176
armored cars : 147 (including 80
Panhard 178 and 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1)
47mm SA37 L/53 AT guns : 16
25mm SA34/37 L/72 AT guns : 24
25mm AA guns : 12
75mm Mle1897 field guns : 48
105mm field guns : 24
+ 6 infantry/motorcycle battalions
CONCLUSION
France
• 411 tanks (including 176 Somua S35 and about 60
Hotchkiss with a 37mm L/33 SA38 gun)
• 147 armored cars
• 40 AT guns
• 12 AA guns
• 72 field guns
• 6 infantry/motorcycle battalions
Germany
• 674 tanks (including 132 Panzer III and Panzer IV)
• 112 armored cars
• 165 AT guns (including 27 8.8cm FlaK L/56)
• 72 AA guns
• 108 field guns (including 72 10.5cm leFH sometimes
used in direct fire against the French tanks)
• 54 infantry guns
• 14 infantry/motorcycle battalions
The 3e DLM (general Langlois) will have to face
directly 2 Panzerdivisionen : 3.PzD (general Stumpff) and 4.PzD (general
Stever). The 2e DLM (general
Bougrain) will be only partially implicated. Therefore the 674 German
tanks including 132 Panzer III and Panzer IV will mainly be opposed to 239
French tanks including 88 Somua S35 tanks.
On 10th May 1940, the reconnaissance elements of the
8e RC (colonel Mario) of the 2e DLM the 12e RC (colonel Leyer) of the 3e DLM
moves towards the Meuse River, Liège and Maastricht. The core of the cavalry
corps is moving to the area of Hannut.
On 11th May, general Prioux choose to wait for the
enemy on the Tirlemeont-Huy line, using the Petite Gette stream and the
Méhaigne small river to anchor the defense. The north part behind the Petite
Gette stream and Hannut is defended by the 3e DLM, which will have to face the
main assault, and the south part behind the Méhaigne small river is defended by
the 2e DLM. During the morning the Belgian army is retreating, exposing the
flanks of the cavalry corps ; the actions of the different allies is not
coordinated unlike the 136 German divisions under a same and efficient high
command. The French reconnaissance patrols are in contact with the German
armored elements between Maastricht and Liège.
The area of the 3e DLM is divided in 2 sectors
organized in depth with infantry strongpoints in each town, village or farm
hold by the 11e RDP (colonel des Revouy) supported by tank groups deployed on
the rear, ready to counter-attack between the infantry positions.
The northern sector is defended by the 6e BLM (colonel
des Loges) :
• 12e RC (40 Panhard 178 armored cars) whose elements
are currently in reconnaissance patrols
• 11e RDP (2 infantry battalions with 44 Hotchkiss
tanks)
The 2nd battalion of the 11e RDP (II/11e RDP,captain
Brau) is deployed around Ophelissem and the 3rd battalion of the 11e RDP
(III/11e RDP,squadron commander Kientz) is around Marilles and Orp.
The southern sector is defended by the 5e BLM (general
de La Font) :
• 1e RC (43 Hotchkiss H39 and 44 Somua S35)
• 2e RC (43 Hotchkiss H39 and 44 Somua S35)
• 11e RDP (1 infantry battalion with 22 Hotchkiss
tanks)
The first line around Hannut and Crehen is defended by
the 1st battalion of the 11e RDP (I/11e RDP, capitaine Lafargue). The 2e RC
(lieutenant-colonel Touzet du Vigier) has the task to protect this first line
with 2 Somua S35 squadrons and 2 Hotchkiss H39 squadrons. The 1e RC
(lieutenant-colonel de Vernejoul) is maintained in reserve in Jauche.
The 2e DLM has also organized an in-depth defense with
the 3 infantry battalions and the 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 armored cars of the 1e
RDP (colonel de Bellefon) and the tanks of the 13e RD (lieutenant-colonel Juin
de Baisse) and of the 29e RD (colonel Baruteau).
12th May 1940
The reconnaissance elements of colonel Leyer delay the
4.PzD until 12th May at 9h00 before moving back to the positions of the 6e BLM.
The 4.PzD attacks, strongly supported by the VIII. Fliegerkorps (general von
Richtofen) and its 342 Ju87 "Stuka" dive bombers. The Pz.Rgt.35
(colonel Eberbach) supported by 1 infantry battalion is the first to attack the
French troops. The Hannut area is attacked by Panzergruppe Eberbach. The I/11e
RDP holds and strikes back despite heavy losses mainly due to the 2.0cm guns of
the Panzer II with their high rate of fire. The German tanks reached the center
of the town. A first counter-attack is launched by the 3rd squadron of the 2e
RC (Hotchkiss tanks, captain Sainte-Marie Perrin) : 11 French tanks and 5
German tanks are destroyed. The 10 other Hotchkiss tanks are ordered to
retreat. The inefficiency of the 37mm SA18 L/21 gun of 80% of the Hotchkiss
tanks is demonstrated ; it is unable to destroy the Panzer III and Panzer IV at
100m.
In Crehen, the Somua S35 tanks (lieutenant Lotsisky)
destroy 4 German tanks, 1 AT gun battery and several trucks. Next to Thisnes,
despite heavy losses, the French troops stop the Germans and destroy the
regimental command tank of colonel Eberbach (who will later be commander of the
4.PzD). The Somua S35 tanks launch a real charge against the enemy and stop the
German advance in front of Crehen. Several German tanks are burning after the
counter-attack of the Somua S35 tanks. At the end of the day, Crehen is
evacuated by the French dragons portés who move back to Merdorp, Jandrenouille
and Jandrain, on their second line.
A renewed German assault is launched between Crehen
and Hannut at 20h00, after a strong artillery preparation. A French artillery
preparation is followed by the counter-attack of 1 Somua S35 tank squadron
(only 21 tanks) of the 2e RC led by captain de Beaufort. The Somua S35 tanks
destroy meticulously every German tank and resist to the German guns. This
attack inflicts heavy losses to the Germans who are forced to retreat. Many
Somua S35 tanks come back with 20-40 2.0cm and 3.7cm hits without any damage.
The 4.PzD is also defeated more north on the Petite
Gette stream, in front of Tirlemont. The German attempts to cross the Méhaigne
river more south are defeated by the tanks of the 2e DLM which also supported
the 3e DLM by firing on the tanks moving against the 3e DLM. During the rest of
the night there are only artillery battles.
During the night, General Hoepner realizes the
inefficiency of his light tanks against the French tanks. He orders to engage
the Hotchkiss tanks but to avoid combat with the Somua S35 tank. The French
47mm L/32 SA35 gun is able to destroy every German tank at 800-1000m but the
the 3.7cm KwK proved to be rather useless at standard range (300-400m) against
the Somua S35. The Somua S35 tanks will have to be neutralized by the Panzer
III, Panzer IV and AT guns at close range and by the 8.8cm FlaK or 10.5cm leFH
in direct fire at long range.
13th May 1940
On 13th May, the 3.PzD joins the 4.PzD. Nevertheless,
at dawn the French troops are attacking and not the German ones. 6 Somua S35
platoons of the 2e DLM (30 tanks), led by captain de Villèle, attack at 5h30
the southern flank of the 4.PzD. They slaughtered German tanks and their losses
were very small and mainly due to the use of 8.8cm FlaK in AT role.
At 9h00, the Luftwaffe attacks massively Jauche,
Merdorp and Jandrain. At 10h00, the German assault is launched. The German
infantry clashes with the III/11e RDP and at 11h00 the tanks of the 3.PzD and
4.PzD attack concentrated on a front of less than 5 km wide. The 3.PzD towards
Orp and the 4.PzD towards Jandrenouille. The French infantry strongpoints
organized in hedgehogs are submerged, many Hotchkiss tanks are destroyed.
At 13h30, the 1e RC (colonel de Vernejoul) which was
maintained in reserve in Jauche in engaged. The 2nd squadron of the 1e RC (21
Somua S35 tanks, captain Ameil) is launched in a north to south attack against
the 4.PzD positions north of Jandrenouille. The Somua S35 tanks stop,
hull-down, at 800m of the German positions. All the German tanks are crowded in
a forest edge. The Somua S35 tanks open fire and slaughter systematically the
German tanks at long range. At the same time, the Somua S35 squadron led by
captain de Beaufort (2e RC) launches a south to north counter-attack against
the other flank of the 4.PzD. The 4.PzD looses many burning tanks and cannot
deploy as it was planned.
Elements of the 3.PzD are engaged to outflank the
Somua S35 tanks of captain Ameil but on the way they encounter the 1st squadron
(21 Somua S35, lieutenant Mazeran) of the 1e RC, perfectly embossed and
engaging them on the flank.
About 50 German tanks are knocked out but the Somua
S35 tanks have to abandon their position because of lack of ammunition. Only
lieutenant Racine's platoon manages to retreat without losses. 29 hits of 2.0cm
and 3.7cm shells are numbered on his tank but without serious damage. Only 16
out of the 42 Somua S35 tanks of the 1e RC are still completely operational on
13th May evening, all covered with 20-40 impacts, the others have to be
repaired or had been abandoned/destroyed. Many German shells had been wasted
against the French tanks without success at a too long range.
The 3.PzD is more lucky, most of the Somua S35 tanks
being already engaged against the 4.PzD. General Stumpff commanding the 3.PzD,
unlike the 4.PzD, doesn't try to reduce all the French infantry strongpoints
but tries to infiltrate deeper. Nevertheless, several tanks remain stuck in the
Petite Gette stream and several tanks are lost in front of the strongpoint of
Marilles hold by the II/11e RDP.
Lieutenant-colonel du Vigier (2e RC) engages against
the 3.PzD his last 4 platoons : 10 Hotchkiss and 10 Somua S35 tanks. Jandrin is
encircled, Jauche is close to the same fate but Marilles can be evacuated by
the infantry under the cover of the French tanks.
The 3e DLM is ordered to move back on new positions at
16h00 and the 2e DLM, far less engaged, at 17h00. The French 1st army is about
30 km behind but general Prioux has been ordered to delay the Germans until
14th May. The cavalry corps moves about 10 km back in the area of Perwez hold
by the 4e GRDI (general Arlabosse), the reconnaissance group of the 15e DIM.
The 4e GRDI includes motorcycle platoons but also 13 Laffly 50 AM and 12
Citroën-Kégresse P16 armored cars. There are no natural elements really useful
to build a defense, only several dispersed and rather useless
"Cointet" mobile AT obstacles.
During this time the Luftwaffe attacks all the French
rears, on the frontline the French and German troops are too closely mixed.
Fuel supply issues force the XVI.Panzerkorps to stop on the Jauche – Ramilles
line. At 21h00, the 3e DLM is deployed on its new positions and the 2e DLM is
deployed early on 14th May.
14th May 1940
North of the French cavalry corps, the British troops
move back behind the Dyle River. South of the French troops the Belgian army
retreats on Bruxelles. Both flanks of the cavalry corps are exposed.
During the morning the 3.PzD and 4.PzD attack strongly
the center of the new French deployment, but they are defeated by the French
artillery and perfectly embossed tanks. The 2e DLM and 3e DLM block the enemy
until 15h00 when they start to move back behind the French 1st army around
Gembloux. Mission accomplished for the cavalry corps of general Prioux.
Germans never attacked with less than a tank battalion
(about 80 tanks including 10 Panzer III and 6 Panzer IV) against French units
of the strength of s squadron (about 20 tanks). The main reason is a better
tactical regulation mainly due to more radio sets on the German side. French
officers latter admitted that they were surprised by the German tank
concentration.
The French tanks due to their 1-man turret were
probably a bit more intricate to use and were more often embossed in a rather
static position, firing on the German tanks at medium/long range, than engaged
in a pure melee-like combat. Contrary to the 1e DLM and 2e DLM who had well
trained crews, the 3e DLM (except some officers from the other DLMs) had only
reservists who did their military service on horse and some of them discovered
their tank a short time before being engaged. They had fired a few shells at
Suippes and now, they were facing a flood of German panzers ! (It is still
amazing that they did not run away at this glance). To worsen the situation,
most of the Somua of the 3e DLM went to combat with 2 crew members instead of
3, many tankers were in permission at the beginning of the combats and
therefore nobody was there to help the commander to reload. In these tanks the
Somua had really a 1-man turret instead of a 1 ½ one. This can explain why
*one* German source (even not specified) is quoted in Gunsburg's article
"battle of the Belgian plain" about the bad gunnery skills of the
French tankers. The 3e DLM in Hannut which had a very high proportion of
reservists sustained heavy losses while the more experienced crews of the 2e
DLM (also less engaged) in the same battle had only light losses. Nevertheless
the 3e DLM reservists inflicted significant losses to the elite of the
Panzerwaffe. Each counter-attack made by a small formation of Somua S35 tanks
was seen as critical by the Germans. For this division, there was of course the
absence of tracer shells and the fact that grossly all the Hotchkiss tanks of
the 3e DLM had 37mm SA18 L/21 guns with only poor anti-tank efficiency. It is a
miracle that they could fight so well against the elite Panzerwaffe in Hannut.
They had better tanks (considering the armor and the armament of the Somua S35
tanks) than most of the German crews but mostly with crews lacking training.
To actually hit a Panzer with the 1-man turret would
prove to be difficult for the 3e DLM : German tanks were fast, training
insufficient and tracer shells absent in the tanks ... But on the German side,
the situation was not very good as well : apart from the 7.5cm L/24 gun of the
Panzer IV, no German shell could pierce the Somua S35 and the Hotchkiss H39 at
a comfortable range, they had to move to close range. German tankers went to
duel the French Somua S35 tanks at long range (around 800 to 1000m) with both
sides using too many rounds for nothing but the 47mm L/32 SA35 gun of the Somua
S35 was able to destroy the German tanks at this range unlike the German ones.
The 4x gunsight of the Somua tanks was also adapted for such long range
targeting. Even counterattacks led by 10 Somua S35 tanks were viewed as
critical on the German side … The French would trade tanks for time. During the
battle, the advancing German tanks were very often attacked on the flanks and
the rear by the French tanks. The French tactics are therefore probably not
that bad as often depicted.
All along the battle, the French troops launched many
counter-attacks despite being massively attacked by the Luftwaffe. The German
colonel Neuman wrote : "the admirable tenacity of the French troops, which
did not loose an inch of ground, despite heavy losses left the battle
indecisive. General Hoepner didn't know the real strength of its opponent and
the location of the core of the enemy armored forces."
The losses are heavy on both sides. The French lost
105 tanks (75 Hotchkiss H35/H39 and 30 Somua S35 tanks) and the Germans about
164 tanks, mainly due to the action of the Somua S35 tanks (despite being often
manned by crews lacking experience) but also several because of the Hotchkiss
tanks or because of the infantry strongpoints including AT guns and AT mines.
Concerning the French tank losses a good part was probably destroyed by the
Luftwaffe and not at all by German tanks. A high proportion of the 75 Hotchkiss
tanks was destroyed by enemy fire. A significant number of the 30 lost Somua
S35 tanks is due to drivers' mistakes or mechanical breakdowns. Noteworthy here
is nevertheless the 100% better survival rate of the more powerful Somua S35
tank compared to the Hotchkiss H39. Concerning the French infantry, the 11e RDP
is reduced to 1 operational battalion.
In tank battles, the one who hold the ground in the
end has a tremendous advantage. Belgian civilians still remember that after the
battle, German field workshops would work during the night to repair some of
the tanks that were knocked out during the battle.
3 officers will be important during the next part of
the war : colonel Leyer, future commander of the 4e DLM in June 1940, will be
in 1942 in North-Africa one of the main actors of the creation of the French
armored arm. Colonel Touzet du Vigier and colonel de Vernejoul will both
command an armoured division for the liberation of France.
1.2 The battle of Gembloux (14th-15th May 1940)
The resistance of the cavalry corps allowed the
deployment of the 1e DM (general Mellier) and the 15e DIM (general Juin) around
Gembloux, on a front of 12 km. Note that during this battle each division had
to defend a 5-7 km front as intended for a French infantry division instead of
20-30 km for the infantry divisions around Sedan. The tanks of the cavalry
corps were still involved on 14th May and the artillery of the cavalry corps
reinforced the French units at Gembloux. In Gembloux, the French infantry/artillery
couple will face with success the German Panzer/Luftwaffe couple of the
Blitzkrieg.
The Gembloux gap is a wide rural plain with numerous
towns, big farms and several woods. In the center there is Gembloux, a little
industrial city of 500 habitants. It is an important communication nest with 2
important roads and 2 important railroads. The Bruxelles-Namur railroad which
is grossly perpendicular to the axis of the German attack is used as main
defensive line as well as the town of Ernage and the city of Gembloux. The
terrain is nevertheless favorable to a tank attack and the skies are Luftwaffe
has the air superiority. The French weakness was in the air. The French 1st
army had only the remains of one group of 26 fighters, one reconnaissance group
and the observation squadrons of the corps as well as 3 modern spotter planes
for each DLM against the hundreds of bombers and fighters of the Germans.
The 1e DM and the 15e DIM have travelled 150 km before
reaching Gembloux. They have complete men strength and are well equipped with
AT guns and a strong field artillery. The French troops are nevertheless
lacking AA guns to face the German air force, despite the fact that the 1e DM
and 15e DIM are among the divisions reinforced with 20mm Oerlikon AA guns,
respectively with 6 and 12 AA guns. Some French 75mm Mle1897 field guns were
also firing time-fuzed shells in the air to simulate an AA barrage against the
German aircrafts, to compensate the lack of AA means. These 2 divisions are
supported by the 13e BCC (45 Hotchkiss H35) and the 35e BCC (45 Renault R35).
Morale in the units of the French 1st army was high, like in the cavalry corps,
based on the soldiers' confidence in their equipment and their leaders. During
the battla of Gembloux, general Mellier and general Juin didn't hesitate to
join the French first lines to support the morale of their troops.
Hoepner's XVI. Panzerkorps (3.PzD and 4.PzD) will led
the attack against Gembloux. In addition, Hoepner disposed of the 20. ID (mot)
and 35. ID during the battle of Gembloux : 4 German divisions against 2 French
ones.
To Hoepner's right, the IV. Korps (general Schwedler)
had the 31. ID, the 7.ID and the 18.ID, from north to south. It is important to
remember that these divisions with their thousands of horses moved primarily by
muscles power unlike the Panzerkorps. The Germans counted above all on their
Luftwaffe to provide fire superiority over the French troops.
14th May 1940
At 14h00, after a strong artillery and air
preparation, the German tanks and infantry assault the French troops. Numerous
tanks are hit by the French AT guns. The AT guns emplacements are well chosen,
camouflaged and AT mines have been laid in front of them. There are fake
positions to attract the Germans and the 25mm SA34/37 L/72 AT gun is very
difficult to spot because of its flash hider. Both French and German
testimonies indicate the difficulty to spot them. German brigade general Kühne
noted : "The accuracy of the 25mm SA34/37 is very good. The front hull
armor of the Panzer III has been easily penetrated by the excellent French 25mm
SA34/37 gun. Trials with booty guns proved that the French 25mm AT gun is
superior to the German 3.7cm PaK. This 25mm AT gun is very hard to spot because
the flash is invisible." The French AT gunner Louis Brindejonc (2e RTM =
2e Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains, of the 1e DM) illustrates himself by
destroying 7 German tanks including one command tank of a German colonel. On
its side, the Ftrench 47mm SA37 L/53 is the best AT gun on the battlefield in
1940, after the 8.8cm FlaK used in AT role. It exceeded widely the German 3.7cm
PaK in terms of penetration and was also superior to the Czech made 4.7cm AT
gun.
General Juin, commander of the 15e DIM (who will led
the 120,000 soldiers of the French expeditionary corps in Italy in
1943-1944) delays the use of its artillery to avoid to hit the last elements of
the 2e DLM engaged in delaying combats in front of his positions. Once these
tanks safe, all the artillery is engaged massively against the German tank
concentrations. In a few minutes, 6 batteries (24 guns) of the 1st artillery
regiment fired 432 75mm shells on the Buis woods used a command post by the
3.PzD thanks to the high rate of fire of the 75mm Mle1897 field guns. General
Stever, commander of the 4.PzD, is wounded by an artillery fire in his HQ. The
Germans, using radio actively and without coding the transmission, are listened
too by the French troops who are rapidly localizing several command centers. At
the same moment general Breith, commander of a German tank brigade, is wounded
in his command tank which is hit by a French 47mm AT gun.
In Gembloux, the French artillery proved to be very
efficient and very precise, stopping many German assaults, firing on each
German concentration, destroying many tanks and silencing the German artillery
by counter-battery fires. Perfectly camouflaged, the batteries remained often
undiscovered despite the German spotting planes. The German artillery and the
Luftwaffe were unable to neutralize the French artillery. The Germans were
often too self-confident and caught on their positions by French
counter-battery fire. The German 10.5cm leFH fired a heavier shell at longer
range than the 75mm Mle1897 but could never match the high rate of fire of the French
light field gun. The French divisions had also 105mm guns and the support of
army artillery units with 155mm guns.
The French artillery was very efficient in 1940 and it
seems to have been often superior to the German artillery : quick reacting, with
a high rate of fire and very accurate. On the German side, the logistics and
sometimes the mobility were probably better organized but they often went in
combat with insufficient ammunition supplies. In Gembloux the French
infantry/artillery couple is opposed to the German tanks/aviation couple and
will prove to be successful. Strong artillery will also show to be the king of
the battle during the second part of World War 2.
In the area of the 1e DM, the action of the 64th
artillery regiment results in the same effect. The 5. Panzerbrigade is forced
to withdraw under dense and very precise artillery fire and to go under cover.
During the battle of Gembloux, about 50 German tanks are destroyed by the
French artillery including 32 German tanks from the Pz.Rgt.35 (colonel
Eberbach) : 9 PzI, 9 PzII, 6 PzIII and 8 PzIV. With about 30 tanks lost in
Hannut against the French tanks, this regiment will loose grossly 50% of its
tank strength during these days.
Due to the events in the area of Sedan the 2e DLM and
3e DLM of the cavalry corps are rapidly removed from the Gemboux area and sent
south to face new threats.
15th May 1940
The German attack on 15th May faces the same fierce
resistance. The main German effort is conducted against the 1e DM where the
terrain is more in favour of the use of tanks. German tanks attacking the 4e RI
(infantry regiment) of the 15e DIM near Beuzet are destroyed by 25mm and 47mm
AT guns.
Between Gembloux and Perbais the battle lasts from
daybreak to the night with fierce combats around Ernage. The Germans manage to
take two towns (Ernage and Perbais) but they don't manage to pierce the French
lines. From the 1st battalion of the 7e RTM (Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains)
in Ernage, 2 companies are totally destroyed. From the 700 men of the battalion
only 74 men are still alive on 16th May.
The 13e BCC (45 Hotchkiss H35 tanks) and the 35e BCC
(45 Renault R35 tanks) are used to launch counter-attacks on the
Gembloux-Ernage railroad, forcing the Germans to retreat. The 7e RTM in a
perfect illustration of the famous "furia francese" launched a
bayonet charge against astonished German troops. The French front didn't
collapse despite all the German supports and heavy assaults. During 2 days, the
Luftwaffe tried without success to neutralize the French artillery. It is a
Pyrrhic tactical/operational victory for the French troops but the German made
a breakthrough in Sedan during the same time.
North of the Gembloux gap, on the Dyle River there is
also a battle. On 15th May Louvain is captured by the Germans to the BEF but a
vigorous British counter-attack enables to take the city back.
In the area of Ottiginies, south of Wavre, the bridge
could not be blown away. The French 2e DINA (general Dame) is deployed on the
railroad on the western bank of the Dyle River. The division has to stop
repeated assault of the 18.ID supported by the Luftwaffe. The main German
effort is against Ottignies but is each time defeated by a very dense and
precise French artillery fire. During all the morning the German assaults are
stopped thanks to the artillery. The main attack is shifted from Ottignies to
Limal to try to cut the French division in 2. Once again a very bloody and well
adjusted artillery fire slaughters the German troops. Thanks to a strong
discipline and courage, the German soldiers manage nevertheless to cross the
Dyle River but the German advance is cancelled due to the heavy losses.
1.3 Conclusion after the battles of Hannut-Gembloux
(12th-15th May 1940)
During 2 days the 3e DLM (and the 2e DLM) managed to
stop 2 Panzerdivisionen and to inflict them heavy losses in Hannut. It is an
incontestable tactical/operational success. The single mission of general
Prioux was to resist enough to delay the German advance during 2 days. This
mission was completely fulfilled. Of course, today we know that the German
attack in Belgium had the aim to attract the allied troops in a trap but the
XVI. Panzerkorps was not simulating its combats and the losses are real.
According to Gunsburg, Hoepner had actually the order to pierce the French line
in Gembloux, in which he failed. The 2 Panzerdivision supported by 2 infantry
divisions were again blocked in Gembloux, by 2 French infantry divisions this
time. On the overall strategic level of course the allies failed in May 1940
but Hannut and Gembloux are French undisputable tactical successes over the
German army. Despite a numeric superiority and heavy aerial support, the
advantage of the radio sets in their faster tanks etc. the Germans failed in
face of the French cavalry corps and the 1st army which were devoid of aerial
support.
After Hannut and Gembloux the losses are heavy on both
sides. The I/2e RTM is reduced to 74 men out of 700 men initially. On the
German side the 12th rifle regiment (4.PzD) has lost 30% of its officers. The
1st battalion of this regiment is left with 4 officers and 31 men operational
from an initial complement that should have exceeded 700 men. The 3rd rifle regiment
(3.PzD) has lost 15 officers and 184 men.
In Hannut some 164 German tanks were knocked out and
in Gembloux the French artillery alone destroyed about 50 German tanks,
including 32 in the Pz.Rgt.35. On 15th May, the 4.PzD had only 137 operational
available tanks left (including only 4 Panzer IV) from its 331 tanks. So there
were 194 tanks damaged, under recovery/repair or destroyed after the battles of
Hannut and Gembloux. Only 41 % operational tanks.
On 16th May :
• the 4.PzD had about 55% operational tanks = 182
available tanks. Therefore 45 extra operational tanks than on 15th May. But 149
tanks remained unavailable, this number is including destroyed tanks and tanks
in the repair workshops.
• the 3.PzD had 75% operational tanks. Therefore about
85 tanks are still destroyed or in the repair workshops one day after the
battles.
On 16th May 1940, one day after the battles, 234 tanks
(35% of the tanks) were not operational anymore, including an unknown number of
definitively destroyed tanks. General Hoepner estimated that he was unable to
continue efficiently the combats the next day. The Germans repaired probably
some more of their tanks during the later days or weeks while the French could
not recover the 105 tanks they had left in Hannut.
The assault of 2 Panzerdivisionen supported by 2
infantry divisions have been stopped on an improvised line by 2 French infantry
divisions. The French battles of Hannut and Gembloux are a French success
without future. On 15th May evening, the French 1st army, although undefeated,
is ordered to move back due to the collapse of the 9th army on the Meuse in the
area of Sedan on 13th May. This situation endangers greatly the right flank of
the 1st army. The French troops will move back and deploy between Arras,
Valenciennes and Tournai.
Some historians have credited the Wehrmacht with an
unusual capacity for professional self-criticism, a key to victory. But
Gembloux was a case where the German high command refused to recognize the
lesson of the limitations of mechanized attack against a conventional defense.
The 6th army was to relearn that lesson in the hardest way at Stalingrad.
General von Bechtolsheim and captain von Jungenfeld
judged the French deplyment in Hannut as very linear and the French units as
poorly mobile. This was repeated by Henrich Bücheler, Hermann Zimmerman and
B.H. Liddel Hart in 1949 but is rather in opposition with the memories of
general Prioux and the books of Genotte and Sarton.
Indeed, the deployment of the cavalry corps is rather
linear, because it is a defensive deployment and because it is clearly on a
north to south axis. But it is for sure an in-depth organization with infantry
strongpoints supported by tank squadrons ready to counter-attack between the
infantry hedgehogs ; and a whole tank regiment in reserve.
It seems indeed poorly mobile because the 2e DLM could
have been far much engaged against the XVI. Panzerkorps instead of staying
south of the 3e DLM. But, one has to be coherent and remember the context. For
the French units this German attack was the main one, not a trap as we know it
today. They knew that the German had 8 extra Panzerdivisionen available
somewhere. They did not know how many more Panzerdivisionen were to be engaged in
that battle. The 2e DLM could have been surprised on its flanks by 1 extra
Panzerdivision.
The 3e DLM accomplished the mission completely and has
delayed the 2 German armored divisions for required time. It inflicted heavy
losses since 164 German tanks were knocked out.
Captain Jugenfeld judged probably not the mobility of
the French tanks by themselves (although for sure the German tanks are faster)
but the mobility of the French tank units. The French tanks launched many
counter-attacks but indeed they also fought several times in rather static
positions. They tried to used hull down emplacements at medium/long range to
engage more numerous German tanks and meticulously fired at them from a safe
position. They had not necessarily the need to move or they would probably have
lost their advantage. They took advantage of the terrain to fulfil their
mission. If engaged all the time in a pure mobile and melee-style combat,
without sufficient radio sets and 1-man turrets, against more numerous enemy
tanks, they would probably have lost more than 105 tanks.
The good armor and the powerful 47mm L/32 SA35 of the
Somua S35 tank coupled to a 4x gunsight made it able to engage safely German
tanks at 800-1000m. At this range it was grossly impossible for a German tank
to destroy the Somua S35. The Somua S35 proved capable of continue to fight
after having received up to about 40 German hits but every German tanks were
easily penetrated by the 47mm SA35 gun. Firing on the German tanks from a well
chosen position was a better solution for the French tankers than to be engaged
in a melee at close range with a 1-man turret, especially for the inexperienced
3e DLM and especially because as explained most of the Somua S35 tanks of this
units had only 2 crew members instead of 3. Captain von Jugenfeld probably
judged the French tank units with his views of German tankers, for who the main
advantages are speed and tactical regulation thanks to the radio. The French
tanks were used in an other way to exploit their own advantages. They proved to
be rather successful according to the German losses, and unlike the German side
without heavy air support or the use of powerful 8.8cm FlaK in AT role.
The French deployment was aimed on defense and
counter-attacks and the German one was focused on the offensive, it was not a
complete meeting engagement.
2. THE 1e DLM IN THE NETHERLANDS
While the 2e DLM and 3e DLM are engaged in Belgium
with the 1st army, the 1e DLM (general Picard) has to fulfil a similar mission
in the Netherlands for the 7th army. The French 7th army has to deploy between
Breda and Turnhout but this line was rather far away from the starting line in
France. The 1e DLM was to move first, to provide intelligence and reconnaissance
for the 7th army and to establish contacts with the Belgian and Dutch armies.
Its mission was then to delay the German troops long enough to allow the 25e
DIM (general Molinié) and the 9e DIM (general Didelet) to occupy the position
on the Marck River.
The 1e DLM will have to face the XVIII. Armee (general
von Kuchler) including the 9.PzD (general Hubrig) and the 1. Kavallerie
Division. The 9.PzD has to cross the Meuse River, to reach Tirlburg and to take
Breda. It will then be split in two groups :
• a first group reinforced by the SS Verfügung (mot)
division
• a second group reinforced by the SS Leibstandarte
Adolf Hitler (LAH) regiment and 2 airborne troops battalions of the VII.
Fliegerdivision with the mission to take Rotterdam
The Dutch troops concentrated their 25 armored cars,
strong infantry and AA elements around their airfields. They inflicted
significant losses to the airborne German operation. The Luftwaffe lost about
300 aircrafts in the Netherlands due to the allied air forces but also because
some 220 Junkers Ju52 transport planes were destroyed, mainly on the ground by
artillery fire.
10th May 1940
The 1e DLM will be supported by 2 reconnaissance
groups :
• one with the 2e GRCA and the 5e GRDI under command
of lieutenant-colonel Lestoquoi, which will operate with the 1e DLM
• one with the 2e GRDI, 12e GRDI and 27e GRDI under
command of colonel Beauchesne, which will operate independently
Nevertheless this reconnaissance units are reduced,
only the motorized elements are used, the horse mounted elements being to slow.
All these reconnaissance groups include motorcycle platoons. The 2e GRDI is the
reconnaissance group of the 9e DIM and includes also 13 Panhard 178 armored
cars and 13 Hotchkiss H39 tanks. The 5e GRDI is the reconnaissance group of the
25e DIM and includes 13 Panhard 178 armored cars and 13 Hotchkiss H35 tanks.
The reconnaissance regiment of the 1e DLM is the 6e RC
(Régiment de Cuirassiers), commanded by colonel Dario, with about 40 Panhard
178 armored cars. It is reinforced by the Lestoquoi group (2e GRCA and 5e
GRDI). Together, they cross the Belgian border at 10h30 and reach the Albert
canal east of Anvers during afternoon. They move beyond Turnhout during the
night. The tanks of the 1e DLM arrive by train around Oosmalle, 15 km west of
Turnhout.
11th May 1940
At 4h15, the first French troops are landing on the
Walcheren and Zuid Beveland islands (Zeeland islands) during operation F (F as
Flessingue) : the 224e RI (infantry regiment) of the 68e DI, supported by 1
group (12 75mm Mle1897 field guns) of the 89e RA. The transport ships are
escorted by 7 torpedo ships.
The reconnaissance elements reach Breda, Tilburg and
Eindhoven. 400 German paratroops held the Moerdjik bridge next to Breda. They
have occupied the previously Dutch fortifications and are equipped with MGs,
mortars AT rifles and AT guns. 1 Panhard 178 platoon (5 armored cars) and 2
motorcycle platoons are ordered to prevent the Germans to move towards Breda
which is the final objective of the 1e DLM. They block the Germans with the
help of Dutch infantry units.
Motorized German elements are moving north-east of
Tilburg and skirmish with French advanced elements. One German tank is
destroyed. Around 21h00, detachment Dudognon (Panhard 178 armored cars from the
6e RC) defend the Moergestel bridge over the Reussel River. At 23h00, 3 German
armored cars accompanied by 3 side-cars and a truck full of troops appear.
Maréchal-des-logis (NCO rank) Gaulthier recalls : "the leading 2 German
armored cars do not see me and head for the Panhard 178 "La Varende".
The first German armored car crushes 2 of our side-cars and barely dodges the
"La Varende" (tearing off a mudguard on the way) and crashes into a
cement pole. The second German armored car (an 8-wheeled Sd.Kfz.231 probably)
stops to my left and opens fire. Meanwhile the third German armored car turns
out in front of me on the bridge. I open fire with my 25mm SA35 gun and I hit
it square on. The German armored cars rolls for several extra meters before
stopping to my right. At the same time, the explosive charges placed under the
bridge explode as the German truck is on the bridge. I was in the turret so the
deflagration stunned me and I fell inside. When I recovered and went back to
the hatch I saw the second German armored car still firing on my left. I
pivoted the turret and fired point blank with both the main gun and MG (with AP
bullets). It quickly ceased firing. The whole action only lasted a quarter of
an hour. The enemy lost around 20 dead and drowned. The 6e Cuirrasiers
detachment has captured 4 men including 2 wounded. The three German armored
cars whose motors cannot be started again are scuttled as well as a German
side-car. Two more intact BMW side-cars will replace the 2 that were crushed
and we used them up to Dunkirk." The French troops had only a few lightly
wounded men.
The 2e GRCA deploys in Breda and the 5e GRDI is in
Tilburg after the loss of 1 armored car in an ambush. The infantry of the 1e
DLM is deployed on the Reussel River between Tilburg and Turnhout, north-west
of the Belgian 18th infantry division. The deployment would be satisfactory but
the Belgian and Dutch troops retreat rapidly and the 1e DLM is suddenly alone
to face the German troops. The Belgian army abandoned a triangle formed by 3
canals (Turnhout, Campines and Albert). The right flank is completely
unprotected and German troops are infiltrating. Tilburg, Breda, Turnhout and
Oostmalle are bombed by the Luftwaffe.
12th May 1940
The 9.PzD has crossed the Meuse River at Gennep and
moves towards Breda. The French reconnaissance elements retreats to the Wortel
– Merxplas – Turnhout – Desschel line after having skirmished with German
armored elements. The movement of the 7th army towards Breda is cancelled to
reconstitute a continuous front after the retreat of the Belgian army on the
Berg op Zoom – Anvers line. The 25e DIM is deploying in Wortel. The infantry of
the 1e DLM and Belgian troops are in contact with the enemy on the Turnhout
canal and are reinforced by the 9e DIM on 13th May only. The pressure of the
9.PzD is increasing in the area of Turnhout and a German infantry division
crosses the canal but cannot advance more.
13th May 1940
the 1e DLM is strongly attacked by the Luftwaffe and
the 9.PzD. Movements through the Anvers tunnel are delayed because Dutch
employees in charge of the air intake went on strike !
General Picard launches 2 Hotchkiss squadrons of the
18e RD (42 tanks) in a counter-attack against the German troops who managed to
cross the Tunhout canal. The objectives are Moll and the bridges on the
Turnhout canal. An other canal has to be crossed and only one, 8 meters long,
engineered bridge enables the crossing of tanks but only the lighter ones. The
Somua S35 tanks cannot be engaged. 1 German battalion is forced to retreat from
Moll but the bridges are strongly defended by AT guns and infantry. Without
infantry the French attack cannot go on. Several German AT guns are destroyed
or crushed and the enemy infantry sustained losses. Several French tanks are
damaged but only when engaged at close range. At the end of the day, receiving
no infantry support to open the way, the French tanks have to move back.
The French troops in the Walcheren and Zuid Beveland
islands are reinforced by the 271e RI, motorized elements of the 68e GRDI and 1
engineer company.
14th May 1940
The 1e DLM is attacked south of Berg op Zoom and
defeats the Germans. Because of the context of the German breakthrough in Sedan
and the very advanced position of the French 7th army and of the 1e DLM, the
French troops are ordered to retreat towards Anvers. The 9e DIM and the 25e DIM
are sent to the south to reinforce the French 1st army.
During this day 1 tank battalion of the 9.PzD,
reinforced by German infantry, AT guns and supported by artillery fire
encircles and destroys the 12e GRDI and several armored cars of the 6e RC
in Berg op Zoom, west of Tilburg.
15th May 1940
Rotterdam and La Haye have been captured by the
Germans. On 15th May, the Dutch army capitulates.
The 1e DLM is deployed in the area of Kontich and
begins to move back at 21h00. The 1e DLM will fight hard delaying combats. In
one week the division moved on more than 600 km, managing to defeat all the
German encirclement attempts before being trapped around Dunkirk.
A strong German attack is launched against the French
troops still in the Zeeland islands. The French 271e RI is in Zuid Beveland and
the French 224e RI is in Walcheren. The French troops are completely cut from
the 7th army, encircled by German troops and the 224e RI is a B reserve
regiment. The 271e RI launches a counter attack but without success. The
regiment is destroyed, only 300 survivors retreat to the island of Walcheren.
Walcheren is defended by the 224e RI supported by 1
group (12 75mm Mle1897 field guns) of the 89e RA and the remains of the 271e RI
who are completely demoralized. These troops are nevertheless supported by the
fire of the French torpedo boats and by several Loire-Nieuport LN.411 dive
bombers of the French fleet air arm. The canal between Wlacheren and Zuid
Beveland is a poor defense since it is completely dry at low water. The French
troops will resist until 17th May.
17th May 1940
The torpedo boat "Cyclone" fires 80 shells
of 130mm on the main road of Zuid Beveland where German troops are
concentrating. It is replaced by the "Siroco" and later by the
British ships "Wolsey" and "Vimiera". During the same time,
the 12 guns of the 89e RA fires 3000 shells of 75mm. Nevertheless this doest
not prevent the Germans to cross the little canal separating the 2 islands,
mainly thanks to the support of the Luftwaffe.
The French defense collapses and the troops have to
retreat slowly to the harbour of Flessingue to be evacuated. General Deslaurens
is killed in Flessingue while fighting, a carbine in his hands. Most of the
French troops are embarked by the French navy but operation F is a failure. The
general commanding the operation has been killed, the 271e RI doesn’t exist
anymore as operational unit and 2 battalions of the 224e RI have been captured.
The 12 guns of the 89e RA group have been destroyed or scuttled. Concerning the
navy it proved able to land and embark troops under heavy German air attacks,
only 1 British ship was sunk.
3. THE FRENCH CAVALRY CORPS AFTER THE 15th MAY
After the combats in Belgium and in the Netherlands,
general Prioux wants to concentrate the 1e, 2e and 3e DLM in the cavalry corps.
Nevertheless it seems not possible, all the time the tank brigades are being
ordered by the army corps to support different infantry units. Prioux cannot
control the fate of his tanks, they are dispersed and cannot be grouped as
wished. On 26th May general Prioux takes command of the 1st army and is
replaced by general de La Font. After Dunkirk, the tank crews, who are the
French troops evacuated in priority reconstitute the cavalry corps but it is
only the shadow of the previous one.
3.1 The grouping of the DLMs in the north (16th-20th
May 1940)
On 16th May the 3 DLMs move back to France.
The 1e DLM is deployed south of Valenciennes and
Cambrai, attached to the 9th army. The Somua S35 tanks are deployed at Quesnoy
and will soon meet German mechanized elements reinforced by AT guns during
short but violent engagements. Rear guard elements of the French 9th army are
engaged in the forest of Mormal, east of Quesnoy. The 7.PzD (general Rommel)
have trapped them in the woods and goes on with its advance, letting the 5.PzD
(general von Hartlieb) reduce them.
On 17th May, the 1e DLM is ordered to block the German
tanks. There is also a fierce battle in and around the Mormal forest. The 1e
DLM meets the 5.PzD and elements of the 7.PzD. The 1e DLM is far from having all
its units but the counter-attack starts at 18h30 from Quesnoy towards
Landrecies. The tanks of the 4e RC (colonel Poupel) and the 18e RD (colonel
Pinon) are incomplete, inferior in number and forced to disperse to control the
assigned area. Nevertheless the morale and the determination are high. During
the counter-attack many Hotchkiss tanks are destroyed by 10.5cm filed guns used
in AT role. The French counter-attack will significantly delay the 5.PzD.
On 17th May 1940, the platoon of lieutenant André De
Conigliano from the 3rd Squadron of the 4e RC meets elements of the the 4e RDP
(Régiment de Dragons Portés - infantry) in Englefontaine (also on the map) and
at 18h00 the platoon received the order to establish a bridgehead at
Landrecies. Arriving next to a level/grade crossing in Landrecies the Somua S35
of lieutnant De Conigliano is under intense fire from German AT weapons
ambushed at point blank range. His tank is knocked out. The driver,
brigadier-chef Fresnais, is killed and the lieutenant is killed too only the
radio/loader is rescued. The 4 other tanks of the platoon, under the command of
maréchal des logis-chef Léger, break the engagement around 19h15 and pull back
towards Englefontaine. They establish a defensive position on the Englefontaine-Landrecies
road.
The Somua S35 tank of the photo is perhaps the one of
lieutenant André De Conigliano but the location of the scene on this photo is
not completely sure. New elements allowing to locate the scene are welcome.
The town of Landrecies was in German hands with the
French tanks arriving. The first French tank was apparently quickly destroyed
in an ambush. There is no mention of German tanks in Landrecies in the journal
of the 4e RC but all the area was hold by elements of the 7.PzD (explaining the
Panzer 38(t)) and by the 5.PzD. The Panzer 38(t) on the photo was perhaps
knocked out by the Somua S35 tanks before or during their movement back towards
Englefontaine.
On 18th May, 12 Somua S35 tanks of the squadron of
captain De Segonzac from the 4e RC are holding the town of Jolimetz along with
one company of Moroccan tirailleurs in support. During all the day they faced
half of the 5.PzD (about 120 tanks and massive infantry, field artillery, AT
guns and aviation support) on the move in this area. 1 Somua S35 tank (Maréchal
des logis Enfroy) is damaged during a reconnaissance and sent back to Quesnoy.
Only 11 French tanks are then controlling the town. The German attack is
launched and after a few losses the Germans sent preferentially the heavier
Panzer IVs in the town itself. At the end of the day the town was completely
surrounded. In 10 vs 1 odd, the French have lost 10 tanks (destroyed or
abandoned) and the Germans 26 tanks, mostly Panzer IVs. That is a perfect
example of what well-trained French crews were able to do.
On 19th May, the 1e DLM is again under command of the
cavalry corps.
On 20th May, the 5e DINA (general Agliany) supported
by the 1e DLM and the 39e BCC (45 Renault R35 tanks) attack the German 8.ID,
20.ID (mot), 4.PzD and 5.PzD. The combats last all the day long and on the
evening several French troops are trapped in the Mormal forest after having
sustained heavy losses.
On 21st May, the French move back to Englefontaine. At
8h00 one battalion of the 24e RTT (Régiment de Tirailleurs Tunisiens) of the 5e
DINA, trapped in the forest, launches a bayonet charge under German MG and
artillery fire to break the encirclement. At 12h00 300 men of the battalion are
KIA and only around 100 men manage to pierce the German lines. The 39e BCC has
lost all its 45 tanks and the 18e RD of the 1e DLM has only a few operational
tanks.
The 2e DLM and 3e DLM on their side covered the
retreat of the French 1st army from 16th May to 19th May. On 18th May, they
launched several violent but limited counter-attacks in the area of Douai.
3.2 Difficult battles in the Flanders and the road to
Dunkirk (21th-29th May 1940)
On 21st May there is an allied counter-attack at
Arras. The British brigade (general Martell) leading the main attack on the
Arras-Bapaume on 15h00 consists in :
Right column :
• 7th Royal Tank Regiment (23 Matilda I and 9 Matilda
II tanks)
• 8th battalion, the Durham Light Infantry
• 365th battery, 92nd regiment, Royal Field Artillery
(12 25 Pdr howitzers)
• 260th battery, 65th anti-tank regiment (12 2 Pdr AT
guns)
• One platoon equipped with 3 French 25mm AT guns
• One motorcycle platoon from 4th Northumbrian
fusiliers
Left column :
• 4th Royal Tank Regiment (37 Matilda I and 7 Matilda
II tanks)
• 6th battalion, the Durham Light Infantry
• 368th battery, 92nd regiment, Royal Field Artillery
(12 25 Pdr howitzers)
• 260th battery, 52nd anti-tank regiment (12 2 Pdr AT
guns)
• One platoon equipped with 3 French 25mm AT guns
• One motorcycle platoon from 4th Northumbrian
fusiliers
• General Martel and is headquarter staff
That makes a total concerning the equipments of :
• 60 Matilda I light tanks
• 16 Matilda II heavy tanks
• 21 armored cars
• 24 25 Pdr howitzers
• 24 2 Pdr AT guns
• 6 French 25mm AT guns
The British troops faced mainly the 7.PzD and the SS
Totenkopf (mot) division, the 5.PzD was arriving from the east but too late to
take part to the battle. The Matilda II heavy tank spread some panic in the
German ranks, mainly in the SS Totenkopf positions where several troops
disbanded, without sufficient mean to destroy the Matilda II. But the 8.8cm
Flak and the use of artillery in direct fire rapidly solved the problem.
The French troops began their attack later, covering the
western flank of the British attack and later the British retreat. They faced
the SS Totenkopf (mot) division and the Pz.Rgt.25 from the 7.PzD. The French
forces were composed of elements from the 3e DLM but in fact mainly of the 13e
BCC (45 Hotchkiss H35 tanks at full strength). The French had a total of about
60 tanks in this battle, therefore probably about 15 Hotchkiss H39 and Somua
S35 tanks from the 3e DLM itself. They were soon confronted to direct 10.5cm
artillery and Flak fire as well as PaK and tanks. They were even fired at by
British AT gunners. The French tanks destroyed at least 3 Panzer IV and 6
Pz38(t) from the Pz.Rgt.25 while covering the British retreat. There is no
precise data concerning the French losses but after the whole battle the 13e
BCC had lost about 10 tanks and the 3e DLM itself lost also probably about 10
tanks. The 11e RDP (Régiment de Dragons Portés) had only light losses.
The British lost 62% of the tanks (47 tanks) before
retreating and had about 50% losses in the infantry. 75% of the reconnaissance
vehicles (16 from 21), mainly from the Northumbrian regiment were also lost.
Concerning the whole German losses, the 7.PzD lost 89
KIAs, 116 WIAs and 173 MIAs mostly POWs as well as about 20 tanks and many AT
guns and various vehicles. The SS Totenkopf (mot) lost about 100 KIAs and 200
POWs. The advance of the 7.PzD is stopped for the rest of day, therefore only
for several hours.
Elements of the SS Totenkopf (mot) division are facing
a British unit defending a bridge on the Scarpe River in the town of
Aubigny-en-Artois (15 km west of Arras). In reprisal for this resistance, 98
people from the town are executed by the Germans. The officer in charge,
Obersturmbahn Fritz Kuchenlein will be hung on 28th January 1949 for his
warcrimes.
The attack started on 15h00 and on the evening it is
rather a tactical failure after only 3 km of progression. After the surprise
effect, the attack is defeated by the 8.8cm FlaK, the Luftwaffe and
counter-attacking German tanks. It illustrates also the inter-allied
communications issues because it was a British initiative. The west cover
assured by the French tanks went deeper towards Amiens but it was a very
limited and secondary action. These troops nevertheless covered the British
retreat and inflicted losses to the German tanks.
The counter-attack at Arras by itself is secondary
regarding the general situation. It blocked indeed the 7.PzD during a few hours
but it is very localized and limited in strength. The core of the German troops
went on with their movements towards the northern harbors regardless of the
battle that was fought.
On 22nd May, the 25e DIM supported by the 38e BCC (45
Hotchkiss H35 tanks at full strength) drives the German 32.ID from the field
near Cambrai on the Escaut River, east of Arras. The French breakthrough is
important and the Germans engage massive air support to stop it. 18 Dewoitine
D520 fighters from GC 2/3 in patrol in the area intercept a Stuka group and 11
Ju87 dive bombers are shot down. But, the French attack is stopped by the
intensity of the bombings.
The same day, general Prioux decides to regroup the
cavalry corps in the Area of Arras. The I/4e RDP supported byt the 18e RD (1e
DLM) leads a brilliant counter-attack which allows to take Mont-Saint-Eloi (see
the map). During this attack, the 2e DLM and 3e DLM covered the flanks of the
attack.
On 23rd May, the 158e RI (colonel Pucinelli) launches
a bayonet charge, between Mons and Valenciennes, against the German 269.ID and
takes Thulin despite the numeric superiority of the Germans. Many German
soldiers are captured during the assault. Thulin is then shelled by the heavy
German artillery. The French troops entrenched in Thulin are finally submerged,
colonel Pucinelli is WIA and captured. The last French troops surrender only
after having used all their ammunition.
On the same day, the 7.PzD outflanks Arras by the west
and the 5.PzD tires to progress by the east after having reduced several
infantry resistances.
General Prioux has deployed the 1e DLM east of Arras.
The division is strongly and frequently attacked by the Luftwaffe. One Stuka
makes a lucky hit on the tank of colonel Pinon, commander of the 18e RD. The
colonel is heavily wounded, the two other crew members (captain Beaussant and
the driver) are dead.
The 3e DLM tries to lengthen the position of the 1e
DLM to the north, up to Notre Dame de Lorette. But, west of Arras, the 7.PzD
turns frankly to the east and heavy combats take place south of Béthune. The 3e
DLM retreats towards Lens. The Germans capture again Mont-Saint-Eloi to the 1e
DLM, which moves north of Arras.
The 2.PzD reaches Boulogne, the 1.PzD reaches Calais,
the 6.PzD is near Saint-Omer and the 7.PzD is in the suburbs of Béthune. The
allied units in the north are completely encircled.
On 24th May, the salient of Arras is evacuated and a
new frontline is established on the canals between Arleux and Béthune. The 3
DLMs will be replaced by infantry units.
On 25th May, the whole cavalry corps (1e, 2e and 3e
DLM) has only 75 operational tanks left out of the 585 initial ones. General
Prioux is replaced by general Langlois and takes command of the French 1st
army.
From 26th to 28th May, the remaining tanks of the
cavalry corps led several violent but limited actions, whose victims are mainly
from the 5.PzD. Platoon strong tank groups at the best are also used around
Watten and Bollezeele in the battle of the Aa canal from 25th to 27th May
against the "Grossdeutschland" regiment, the SS Leibstandarte Adolf
Hitler (LAH) regiment, the 20.ID (mot) division and the 6.PzD.
On 29th May, the cavalry corps retreats to Dunkirk.
The remaining tanks are first grouped at Coudekerque and fight until the end
under the command of squadron commander Marchal. Many times their intervention
even in small numbers allowed to defeat German attacks on the pocket and to
delay the fate of the trapped troops. The last Somua S35 tanks are out of fuel
and scuttled.
Dunkirk and the evacuation of the BEF would probably
not have been possible without the limited success of the French troops
especially the cavalry corps in Belgium and later which delayed the Germans
enough and without the stiff French resistance around Lille which blocked 7
German divisions (from 28th to 31st May about 40,000 French troops commanded by
general Molinié - remnants from various units - held about 800 German tanks and
110,000 soldiers from the 4.PzD, 5.PzD, 7.PzD, 7.ID, 217.ID, 253.ID and 267.ID.
They fought encircled until all their ammunition was used and led several
counter-attacks, the commander of 253.ID, general Kühne, was even captured. The
Germans let the defenders march in ranks in the street without their weapons
after the battles to render them the honors and salute their fierce resistance.
Even Churchill in his memories recognized the role of the troops in Lille. Even
Churchill in his memories recognized the role of the troops in Lille. The
ground defense of the pocket of Dunkirk itself was mostly in French hands while
British had the primary order to evacuate. This resistance played a role in the
success of the evacuation but generally people think that French troops did
nothing there. The British historian Julian Jackson for example recognized
partly the role of the French troops. If on the ground the defense was mostly
French, in the skies over Dunkirk the allied aircrafts were mostly from the RAF
but several French fighters took part to the battle. Nevertheless most of the
French air force was engaged more south. For the evacuation itself, the Royal
Navy was not alone since French ships participated also to the evacuation.
Nevertheless in many Anglo-american documents the French troops are simply
ignored.
13 French, 13 Belgian and 9 British divisions are lost
in the north = 35 divisions, including numerous and precious equipments. To
defend the 500 km of the so-called "Weygand Line", from the North Sea
to the Rhine, there remains only 63 divisions (59 French, 2 Polish depending
from the French army and 2 British divisions) to stop 136 German ones, including
10 Panzerdivisionen, 6 motorized infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division.
With such means only a frontline on the Somme and Aisne Rivers can be defended.
Mathematically the campaign is lost, but the French troops will offer a fierce
resistance during June 1940, inflicting heavy losses to the Germans and later
to the Italians who declared war to an already beaten opponent.
3.3 The silence of the cavalry corps (30th May – 10th
June 1940)
From 30th May to 10th June the cavalry corps
disappeared as operational entity. Evacuated from Dunkirk to Great Britain,
transported back to France (via Dover, Bovington and finally Brest again in
France), the men from the cavalry corps are equipped again. Captain Devouges is
in charge of the transit for the 1e DLM. The crews left Great Britain on 2nd
June. Contrary to other units the men always refused to be disarmed. Indeed all
the French troops arriving in Great Britain were disarmed by their ally.
4. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE CAVALRY CORPS
Beginning June, the cavalry constitutes 5 DLMs, but
reduced ones. All the possible equipments are used : brand new tanks from the
factories or very old ones taken in dumps, parks and schools or training
centers. Several of these tanks are completely exhausted. Several Panhard 178
went in combat without turret : with home-made armor plates (16-20mm)
forming a casemate (40 would have been produced during June 1940) and armed
with 25mm SA35 or 47mm SA34 guns and a LMG or completely without
turret/casemate and simply armed with a LMG.
Some Panhard 178 armored cars had a modified turret
with a 47mm SA35 gun and a coaxial MG in June 1940 (Renault turret). This
version participated to combats in June 1940 with at least one vehicle on the
Loire River according to a photographic proof but the unit equipped with it is
not known. It may have been of these DLMs.
The new 1e, 2e and 3e DLM (created west of Paris) are
under the direct command of the cavalry corps but not the 2 others. The remains
of the 5 DLCs were to be converted to a DLM "type réduit", a reduced
DLM :
• 1e DLC as 4e DLM
• 2e DLC as 5e DLM
• 3e DLC as 6e DLM
• 4e DLC as 7e DLM
• 5e DLC as 8e DLM
The deteriorating military situation meant only 4e DLM
and 7e DLM were actually formed.
1e DLM (colonel Beauchesne) : ready on 10th June at
Pacy-sur-Eure. It includes :
• 10 Somua S35 tanks
• 10 Hotchkiss H39 tanks
• 5 Panhard 178 armored cars
• 2 motorcycle squadrons
• 2 dragons portés battalions
2e DLM (general Bougrain) : ready on 10th June at Dourdan. It
includes:
• about 20 tanks
• 2 Panhard 178 squadrons (42 armored cars if at full
strength, actually probably around 20 only)
• 2 motorcycle squadrons
• 2 dragons portés battalions
3e DLM (general Testard) : ready on 10th June at
Conches. It includes :
• 2 Somua S35 squadrons (42 tanks if at full strength,
actually probably around 20 only)
• 2 Panhard 178 squadrons (42 armored cars if at full
strength, actually probably around 20 only)
• 1 dragons portés battalion
• 1 group of 75mm Mle1897 field guns (12 guns)
4e DLM (general Leyer) : created east of Paris with
remnants of the 1e DLC, 17e GRCA, 2e GRDI and reinforced with a motorcycles and
armored cars group coming from Montlhéry where is based the COMAM (Centre
d'Organisation de Motocyclistes et Automitrailleuses). The 4e DLM is
attached to the 7th army on 10th June and includes :
• 10 Somua S35 tanks
• 10 Hotchkiss tanks
• the 1e RAM (armored car regiment) with about 12
Panhard 178 armored cars
• 2 infantry regiments (1e Chasseurs and 5e Dragons)
• 2 batteries of 75mm Mle1897 field guns (8 guns)
• 1 engineer company
• 1 signal company,
• 1 HQ motor transport company
• 1 divisional quartermaster group
• 1 divisional medical group
7e DLM (general Marteau) : created already on 5th June
with remnant of the 4e DLC, it is attached to the 2nd army. The order of battle
of the 7e DLM is following :
• 14e BLM (Brigade Légère Mécanique) :
lieutenant-colonel Grévy
o 4e RAM (Régiment d'Auto-Mitrailleuses)
: commandant Chapel
2 squadrons with armored cars and motorcyclists (10
Panhard 178, 14 AMR-33/35)
o 8e RD (Régiment de Dragons) :
commandant Deron
4 Hotchkiss tank squadrons with 22 very old Hotchkiss
H35 tanks and 20 new Hotchkiss H39 tanks with the 37mm SA38 gun.
o 4e EDAC (Escadron Divisionnaire
Anti-Char) : capitaine Hapette Saint-Martin
(12 25mm SA34/37 AT guns)
• 4e BCM (Brigade de Cavalerie
Motorisée) : colonel Préaud
o 14e RDP (Régiment de Dragons portés)
: commandant Sonnery
1 motorcyclists / armored cars squadron (7 Laffly
50AM, 16 LMGs, 1 60mm mortar)
3 infantry squadrons (54 LMGs, 12 MMGs, 3 60mm
mortars)
1 support squadron (4 25mm SA34/37 AT
guns, 4 81mm mortars, 8 MMGs)
o 31e RDP (Régiment de Dragons portés)
: commandant De Villers
1 motorcyclists / armored cars squadron (7 Laffly
50AM, 16 LMGs, 1 60mm mortar)
3 infantry squadrons (54 LMGs, 12 MMGs, 3 60mm
mortars)
1 support squadron (4 25mm SA34/37 AT
guns, 4 81mm mortars, 8 MMGs)
o 4e escadron de réparation divisionnaire
(recovery/repair squadron) : capitaine Palies
• 77e RATT (Régiment d'Artillerie
Tractée Tout Terrain) : lieutenant colonel Baratchart
(12 75mm Mle1897 guns, 12 105mm C guns,
5 47mm SA37/39 AT guns, 3 25mm AA guns)
• 33/1 compagnie de sapeurs mineurs
(engineer company)
• 1 divisional quartermaster group
• 1 divisional medical group
5. THE LAST BATTLES OF THE CAVALRY CORPS
From 10th to 25th June, the 5 reduced DLMs will fight
the German army uninterrupted, delaying them on each River or stream. The
Panzerwaffe nevertheless favoured movement to combat and avoided as often as
possible other battles like Hannut and Gembloux. The foot infantry units of the
Heer were in charge of neutralizing the French pockets. The French cavalry
crews will sacrifice themselves to cover the retreat of the French infantry
units.
Fall Rot launches the Germans on the Somme and Aisne
Rivers on 9th June 1940. The French lines are also attacked on the Seine and
Marne Rivers. The cavalry corps (1e, 2e and 3e DLM) covers the retreat of the
army of Paris (general Héring) by delaying the Hoth Panzerkorps from Pacy to
Louviers. The 4e DLM will have the same kind of mission for the 7th army from
Epernay to Meaux.
5.1 The 7e DLM on the Retourne River (10-11th June)
South of the Aisne River is created a "groupement
cuirassée" (armored group) with the 3e DCR and the 7e DLM under the
command of general Buisson. They will have to face the tanks of the XXXIX.
Panzerkorps (general Schmidt) with the 1.PzD and 2.PzD. On 10th May morning,
the "groupement Buisson" is the single unit able to lead a
counter-attack in the area of Rethel. But it is south of the Retourne River and
has first to cross it. The tanks reach their base line only at 14h00. At this
moment the German bridgehead's size has already considerably increased. After
refuelling, the unit is ready to attack at 15h00 but is only launched at 17h00.
The French counter-attack is launched without
artillery or aviation support. The movements of the "groupement
Buisson" are spotted by the Luftwaffe and will be stopped mainly by the
numerous guns installed in anti-tank role by the 21.ID. The "groupement
Buisson" is split in 2 parts :
1) One part crosses the Retourne river more on the
east and attacks the Germans from an east / south-east axis :
• Northern attack on the Annelles - Perthes axis
(groupement of lieutenant-colonel Maître) with elements of the 3e DCR : 17
Hotchkiss H39 (2/42e and 3/42e BCC), 9 Renault B1bis (2/41e BCC) and the 3
infantry companies of the 16e BCP (bataillon de chasseurs portés).
• Southern attack on the Juniville - Tagnon axis
(groupement of lieutenant-colonel Salanié) with elements of the 3e DCR : 25
Hotchkiss H39 (45e BCC), 10 Renault B1bis (1/41e BCC) and of the 7e DLM :
reduced 31e RDP (Régiment de Dragons Portés).
• A few B1bis tanks from the 3/41e BCC remain in
Annelles as protection and take not part to the attack.
2) One part south of the Retourne river, composed of
the 10e BCC (40 Renault R35) and of the 7e DLM attacks on the Ménil-Lépinois -
Alincourt - Le Châtelet axis.
The 7e DLM order of battle is slightly modified during
this battle :
• 14e BLM (Brigade Légère Mécanique) :
lieutenant-colonel Grévy
o 4e RAM (Régiment d'Auto-Mitrailleuses)
: commandant Chapel
2 squadrons with armored cars and motorcyclists (10
Panhard 178, 14 AMR-33/35)
o 8e RD (Régiment de Dragons) :
commandant Deron
4 Hotchkiss tank squadrons with 22 very old Hotchkiss
H35 tanks and 20 new Hotchkiss H39 tanks with the 37mm SA38 gun. But only about
25 tanks will reach the deployment area, most of the exhausted Hotchkiss H35
tanks have been immobilized during the move.
o 4e EDAC (Escadron Divisionnaire
Anti-Char) : capitaine Hapette Saint-Martin
(12 25mm SA34/37 AT guns)
• 4e BCM (Brigade de Cavalerie
Motorisée) : colonel Préaud
o 14e RDP (Régiment de Dragons portés)
: commandant Sonnery
1 motorcyclists / armored cars squadron (7 Laffly
50AM, 16 LMGs, 1 60mm mortar)
3 infantry squadrons (54 LMGs, 12 MMGs, 3 60mm
mortars)
1 support squadron (4 25mm SA34/37 AT
guns, 4 81mm mortars, 8 MMGs)
o 31e RDP (Régiment de Dragons portés)
: commandant De Villers
1 motorcyclists / armored cars squadron (7 Laffly
50AM, 16 LMGs, 1 60mm mortar)
3 infantry squadrons (54 LMGs, 12 MMGs, 3 60mm
mortars)
1 support squadron (4 25mm SA34/37 AT guns, 4 81mm
mortars, 8 MMGs)
But the 2/31e RDP and 5/31e RDP squadrons are engaged
north of Juniville, with the groupement Salanié. They are not available for the
7e DLM.
o 4e escadron de réparation divisionnaire
(recovery/repair squadron) : capitaine Palies
• 77e RATT (Régiment d'Artillerie Tractée Tout
Terrain) : lieutenant colonel Baratchart
(12 75mm Mle1897 guns, 12 105mm C guns,
5 47mm SA37/39 AT guns, 3 25mm AA guns)
• 33/1 compagnie de sapeurs mineurs
(engineer company)
• 1 divisional quartermaster group
• 1 divisional medical group
The 7e DLM is reinforced by the 10e BCC (40 Renault
R35 tanks).
On 10th June, the 7e DLM will have to face mainly the
1.PzD (general Kitchner) :
• PzBfWg : 18
• Panzer I : 52
• Panzer II : 98
• Panzer III : 58
• Panzer IV : 40
258 tanks (including 98 Panzer III and Panzer IV)
• armored cars : 56 (including about
23 with a 2.0cm L/55 gun)
• 8.8cm Flak (Sfl) auf SdKfz8 : 6 (self-propelled
8.8cm anti-tank gun)
• 8.8cm Flak : 9 (often used in anti-tank
role)
• 3.7cm Pak36 : 51
• 2.0cm / 3.7cm Flak : 24
• 15cm sIG33 auf PzKpw I : 6
• 7.5cm leIG : 24
• 15cm sIG : 8
• 10.5cm leFH18 : 24 (sometimes used in
anti-tank role)
• 15cm sFH : 12
But the 1.PzD is reinforced by elements if the 17.ID
anf 21.ID. Note that before "Fall Rot" in France, the 1.PzD seems to
have been reinforced to 276 tanks.
About 65 French tanks with only about of them 20 armed
with the 37mm SA38 gun will have to face at least 258 tanks including 98 Panzer
III and Panzer IV and strongly supported by infantry, artillery and the German
aviation.
10th May
The various reconnaissance patrols launched by the 4e
RAM spot 60 enemy tanks between Neuflize and Alincourt at 10h30. At 11h00 about
100 German tanks are reported north of Juniville. At 12h05 the patrols report
the encirclement of Perthes by 30 tanks and motorcyclists. One Panhard 178 is
lost during the morning by one of the numerous Ju87 Stuka attacks, the German
control the skies and use their Luftwaffe as often as possible to support their
attacks. The French air force is inactive and the AA guns are rather rare.
At 12h30, the 7e DLM is deployed in the area of La
Neuville in order to control the line Ménil-Lépinois – Aussonce – La Neuville.
The Hotchkiss H35 tanks of the 8e RD have been taken
in schools and are very old and exhausted vehicles. Most of them have been
immobilized by mechanical failures. All the 20 Hotchkiss H39 tanks but only
very few Hotchkiss H35 tanks are operational in the 8e RD which is therefore
reduced (probably about 25 tanks).
The 1/31e RDP infantry squadron/company is deployed
north of La Neuville in a wood on the border of the road between Juniville and
La Neuville.
2 infantry companies, 1 support company and armored
cars are in Aussonce.
3 Hotchkiss tanks squadrons of the 8e RD (about 20
tanks) relieve Panhard 178 armored cars from the 4e RAM in Ménil Lépinois : the
3/8e RD in the town itself and the 2/8e RD and 4/8e RD next to it.
French reconnaissance patrols are in contact with
German tanks on the road between Juniville and La Neuville. The Panhard 178
armored cars try to delay the advancing German tanks but one vehicle is lost
and the reconnaissance patrol retreats.
The groupement Aussenac next to La Neuville is
composed of :
• 10e BCC (40 Renault R35)
• 1/8e RD (8 Hotchkiss H35/39)
• 4/14e RDP (1 infantry squadron/company) reinforced
by AT guns from the EDAC
The 1/10e BCC (13 Renault R35 tanks) remains in La
Neuville and the other elements of the "groupement Aussenac" begin
their movement towards Juniville at 13h30 but they are blocked 2 km north by
numerous German tanks and AT guns.
The 2/10e BCC (13 Renault R35 tanks) engages the
battle but their 37mm SA18 gun lacks power and they have to go to close range
(< 25-100m) with more numerous German tanks which can engage them from at
200-300m. 9 Renault R35 are destroyed and the 4 other retreat. Of these 4 tanks
only one is able to continue to fight.
The German tanks continue their progression and
encounter the trucks carrying the 4/14e RDP (infantry company). The French
troops disembark in a hurry and take position in the woods around the road.
Immediately, the 1/8e RD with only 8 tanks
counter-attacks against about 30 German tanks. The squadron commander (captain
de Loriol) with 3 other tanks manages to outflank the enemy and 2 German tanks
are destroyed by the maréchal-des-logis Flouret. Surprised, the Germans stop
their attack and move back. On the French side 2 immobilized Hotchkiss tanks
are scuttled.
The 3/10e BCC (13 Renault R35 tanks) is then ordered
to push towards Juniville to rescue the survivors of the 2/10e BCC. They are
soon stopped by a German artillery barrage followed by German tanks attacking
on the flank. One Renault R35 is destroyed, the others retreat in the cover of
the woods hold by the French infantry. During all the afternoon, the 3/10e BCC
launches successive counter-attacks to delay the 1.PzD, loosing 7 more Renault
R35 tanks, but they manage to rescue the survivors from the 2/10e BCC and to
recover several immobilized tanks. One motorcycle platoon advances 500m more
north and capture several items and documents in a German tank wreck. Under
heavy fire they retreat with 3 WIAs.
At about 16h00, the German tanks and mechanized troops
attack the woods hold by the French infantry supported by the remaining 6
Renault R35 and 6 Hotchkiss H35/39. Two German tanks are destroyed and once
more they are pulled back. On the French side 2 men have been killed and
several WIA. Two German AT guns take position next to the woods and open fire
on a R35 tank. 2 shells miss the tank and both AT guns are destroyed.
The Germans cancel their attack and the task is given
to the German artillery which bombards the woods occupied by the French troops.
During the evening, most of the French tanks move back to La Neuville. At
21h00, the French infantry is close to be out of ammunition but is still
controlling the road, supported by 3 Renault R35 tanks and 2 25mm AT guns.
The French infantry in the woods is being slowly
encircled and at 23h30 they are ordered to retreat to La Neuville, on the main
French line.
At 18h00 German tanks are also spotted in the woods
north of Aussonce, between Ménil Lépinois and Juniville. Lieutenant De Villèle
from 2/8e RD moves with 4 Hotchkiss tanks to meet them. They first encounter
ambushed German AT guns and later tanks. 2 Hotchkiss tanks are destroyed and
lieutenant De Villèle is KIA with his driver.
From the 27 Renault R35 tanks engaged by the 2/10e BCC
and 3/10e BCC (two companies of 13 tanks and the battalion commander's tank) :
• 10 have been destroyed
• 10 are damaged but recovered and under repair
• 7 are operational
The 1/10e BCC has 13 more tanks and there are also the
5 replacement tanks of the battalion for a total of 20-25 operational tanks.
The remnants of the 1/8e RD (1 fully operational tank
and 5 tanks under repair) deploy at La Neuville at 01h00. At the end of the
10th June, 4 Hotchkiss tanks have been destroyed, 5 are under repair and about
16 are still operational.
That makes a total of 36-41 operational tanks and
several armored cars to stop the German Panzerdivisionen moving south. But the
Germans have to delay the advance, out of fuel and ammunition they return to
their lines on the Retourne river and will proceed with their offensive on 11th
June.
The town of La Neuville will be bombarded all night
long by the German artillery, 1 AMR is destroyed by the indirect hit of a 150mm
shell.
At 22h30 the 7e DLM is reinforced by a company of the
152e RI, the "Red Devils" of the 14e DI.
11th May
On 11th June 1940 the French forces move about 10-15km
south / south-west while fighting all the day long. During all the day the
French troops will be attacked by the Luftwaffe. During following days the
battle strength of the 7e DLM will quickly fall to about 50%.
On 11th June morning the reinforcement company of the
152e RI stops German infantry between Aussonce and La Neuville. The French
strongpoints south of La Neuville (3/31e RDP and 4/31e RDP), next to the Le
Merlan farm, immobilize a few German tanks thanks to their AT guns. The German
artillery enters in action, destroying several French trucks and side-cars.
The 8 remaining Panhard 178 armored cars from
capitaine Gobert delay the German advance south of La Neuville while the French
infantry retreats. Ambushed in the woods they surprise 30 German tanks : 2 are
immobilized and 3 are knocked out. The swift French armored cars hit and run
without having to sustain losses until they are ordered to retreat too.
In Selles and Heutrégiville, the few tanks from the
4/8e RD delay the German advancing tanks. In Pontfaverger 2 Hotchkiss from the
1/8e RD resist against 50 German tanks until their complete destruction.
In Béthenville, engineers supported by dragoons
(infantry) mine the bridges (2 bridges and 1 rail-road bridge) and blow them at
12.30 AM. They entrench behind the Suippe river and face the German attacks.
But the Germans have crossed the river in Pontfaverger and enters in
Béthenville from the south-west. Thanks to an alcohol distillery put on fire
while the German tanks were in the corresponding street, a real firewall is
created, blocking the German progression. The remaining tanks of the 8e RD
prevent the encirclement while the infantry exits from Béthenville and
retreats. The last Hotchkiss tanks of the 8e RD are destroyed, sacrificed
against impossible odds to save their comrades.
The 7e DLM will fight continuously until 25th June
1940, sacrificing its men and vehicles to cover other troops, inflicting heavy
losses to the enemy.
5.2 The retreat (11-25th June)
On 11th June, the 1e DLM takes Heunières to the
Germans, north of Pacy-sur-Eure, before withdrawing on order. The Somua S35
tanks destroy 6 German AT guns.
On 12th June at 13h45, general Weygand orders the
retreat of the French army, the high command moves to Briare. The French army
plans to resist on the Loire River. The 1e DLM is attacked in the area of
Evreux by the 27.ID. The infantry defends itself very well. Encircled, on
squadron is rescued thanks to a counter-attack led by French tanks. The 2e DLM
is engaged in fierce house by house combats Jaudrais and Senonches. The 4e DLM
continues to cover the retreat of the 7th army.
The 7e DLM has lost most of its tanks and armoured
cars on 14th June. One of its remaining element will face a dramatic fate near
Nevers. This group is composed of several side-cars, 10 tanks and a motorized
infantry platoon. They encounter some light German reconnaissance elements,
which are crushed easily, but these elements are the first one of the XIV.
Panzerkorps ! The men of the 7e DLM immobilize 2 German tank battalions during
several hours and destroy several enemy AFVs before being killed or captured.
The sacrifice of this small unit enables the rest of he 7e DLM, as well as the
troops they are covering, to cross the Loire River safely.
On 14th June, 2 dragons portés squadrons supported by
Somua S35 tanks of the 3e DLM destroy a whole German motorized column at
Damville. On 16th June the 3e DLM fights next to Ferté-Vidame.
The cavalry corps arrives completely behind the Loire
River on 19th June and takes part during 48 hours to the combats on this new
line. They are deployed east of the famous cavalry cadets from Saumur.
On 21st June the retreat goes on. On 22nd June, the 2e
DLM has crossed the Creuse River and is decided to delay the Germans in the
Haye – Descartes area. At 8h30 an attack is launched against German motorized
elements, which are reinforced by AT guns. Many German vehicles and AT guns are
destroyed but 5 French tanks are damaged. During the afternoon one German
assault is defeated.
On 23rd June, the cavalry corps covers the retreat of
the French army on the Dordogne River. The 7e DLM is reduced to 2 motorized
squadrons without tanks and 2 reduced artillery groups.
On 25th June, the armistice comes into effect and the
cavalry corps is ordered to stop the combat.
The 1e DLM is in the area of Riberac. It is disbanded
on 31st July 1940.
The 2e DLM is in the area of Périgueux. It is
disbanded on 16th July 1940.
The 3e DLM is in the area of Thiviers. It is disbanded
on 11th July 1940.
The 4e DLM is in the area of Saint-Etienne de Fursac.
It is disbanded just after the armistice.
The 7e DLM is in the area of Massiac. It is disbanded
just after the armistice.
The armoured units of the French cavalry fought
valiantly from 10th May to 25th June 1940, sometimes in impossible odds but
always with courage and honor.
______________________________
Sources:
• "Avec la 3e DLM et le corps de
cavalerie" (G. Delater)
• "Blitzkrieg à l’Ouest, Mai-Juin
40" (Jean-Paul Pallud)
• "Comme des lions – mai/juin 1940
– le sacrifice de l'armée française" (Dominique Lormier)
• "Divided and Conquered : The French High
Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940." (Jeffery A. Gunsburg, 1979)
• "Gembloux" (Henri Aymes)
• "Histoire de Guerre" magazine n°40 (based
on several books and official reports)
• "Histoire de Guerre" magazine n°46 (based
on several books and official reports)
• "Histoire de Guerre" magazine
n°5 (based on several books and official reports)
• "La campagne de 1940"
(Christine Levisse-Touzé)
• "L'Arme Blindée Française (Tome
1) : Mai-juin 1940 ! Les blindés français dans la tourmente" (Gérard
Saint-Martin). The author is a
French cavalry colonel with an History Ph.D.
• "Le mythe de la guerre-éclair –
la campagne de l'Ouest de 1940" (Karl-Heinz Frieser). The author is a German Bundeswehr
researcher (colonel), in German the book is entitled "Blitzkrieg
Legende".
• "L'escadron de Segonzac"
(Olivier d'Ormesson)
• "Mai - Juin 1940 : défaite
française, victoire allemande, sous l'oeil des historiens étrangers"
(Maurice Vaïsse)
• "Mai - Juin 1940 : les
combattants de l'honneur" (Jean Delmas, Paul Devautour and Eric Lefèvre)
• "The battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940 : the
'Blitzkrieg' checked" (Jeffery A. Gunsburg, the journal of military
history 64 (January 2000), 97-140)
• "The battle of the Belgian plain, 12-14 May
1940 : the first great tank battle" (Jeffery A. Gunsburg, the journal of military
history 56 (April 1992), 207-244)
• "The French army 1939-1940 – organisation,
order of battle, operational history" (4 volumes, Lee Sharp)
• "Une vie de char" (Robert
Le Bel)